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Africa and the World Conflict

BY LOUIS E. FRECHTLING

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BY LOUIS E. FRECHTLING

WHILE the Battle of Russia has overshadowed other phases of the second World War during the summer and autumn of 1941, the prospect that hostilities on the eastern front may decrease in tempo during the coming winter creates the possibility that the continent of Africa may become a major theatre of conflict. Since Africa is for the most part controlled by powers participating in the struggle, it has already felt the impact of war and may expect to be more directly involved in the future.

The continent's importance results largely from its strategic position as a great land mass lying on the southern flank of Europe, facing the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. If the Allies are able to maintain their control over most of Africa and keep the French and Spanish governments out of the war, they can effectively prevent the Nazis from breaking out of Europe and gaining access to the high seas. Africa is also the most advantageous base from which the Allies can in the future take the offensive against the Axis. In the present stage of the war, Africa provides and protects the shortest and best routes linking the western front on the English Channel with the Middle Eastern and Russian fronts. Ships carrying supplies from Britain and the United States pass around Africa, while airplanes fly across Allied territory on their way from the democratic homelands to the fighting forces in western Asia. Africa, moreover, makes a limited contribution to the war effort of the Allied powers—a contribution which increases in significance as the war is prolonged.

It was not until Italy's entrance into the conflict in June 1940 that Africa was directly brought into the war. Mussolini expected to cooperate in the Axis war effort by striking at the British in north-east Africa. But before his generals could muster sufficient forces to take the offensive, the British remedied the serious weaknesses in men, matériel and strategic position caused by France's defection and attacked in December 1940, virtually eliminating Fascist forces in East Africa and driving half-way across Libya before strong German reinforce-

ments compelled their retreat to the borders of Egypt.¹

Following Hitler's overwhelming successes in the Battle of France and again after his conquest of the Balkans, many observers expected that the next move would be a drive into Africa—either through Spain, across the Straits of Gibraltar, and into French North Africa, or as a gigantic pincers movement converging on the Suez Canal from the north and east. Possession of Africa would give the Nazis several advantages, of which the most significant is access to the high seas. German domination of Africa would also divert some raw materials and foodstuffs to Nazi Europe, thereby reducing the resources of the Allied powers. Moreover, a Nazi conquest of Africa would heighten the prestige of the Reich and redress one of the most publicized grievances of the German people. The German empire, which did not achieve unification until 1871, was late in entering the international race for colonial possessions. During the next half-century, Britain established dominion over large areas in equatorial and southern Africa, and in the guise of a protecting power controlled Egypt. France obtained most of western Africa from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Guinea, while Belgium annexed the Congo, and Portugal expanded its territories in Angola and Mozambique. Germany was able to obtain only comparatively unimportant and scattered colonies, which it lost under the Treaty of Versailles, when they were assigned as League of Nations mandates to the victorious Allies. South West Africa was entrusted to the Union of South Africa; German East Africa was divided between Great Britain and Belgium; and the Cameroons and Togoland were partitioned between Great Britain and France.²

Early in his political life, Hitler deprecated the

1. For a summary of the Battle of Africa, see Max Werner, *The Battle for the World* (New York, Modern Age, 1941), pp. 275-92.

2. The background of imperialist rivalry in Africa is told succinctly in M. E. Townsend, *European Colonial Expansion Since 1871* (Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1941), pp. 45-232. See also Lamar Middleton, *The Rape of Africa* (New York, Smith and Haas, 1936); W. L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism* (2 vols., New York, Knopf, 1935).

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importance of colonial expansion, holding that the nation's efforts were needed for the development of the Fatherland and should not be dissipated abroad.³ After 1936, however, he gave official support to the exponents of colonial expansion by demanding return of African territories lost in 1919.⁴ This claim was probably made largely for its propaganda value, but it now seems well established that, in the event of German victory, the Nazi "New Order" would extend over all of Africa. Deductions drawn from the statements of Axis leaders, the reports of European observers, and the fate of territories already under Nazi rule indicate that Hitler plans to exercise hegemony over Africa, perhaps allocating the administration of the northeast portion (but not the Suez Canal) to Mussolini in recognition of his long-standing claims to a new Roman empire,⁵ and parts of northwest Africa to "collaborationist" governments in France and Spain. To Africa would be removed some of the "inferior" racial groups—Slavs, Jews,⁶ etc.—who, along with the indigenous Negro peoples ranking lowest in the Nazi "racial scale," would be relegated to the production of raw materials for German Europe.⁷

The Nazis, however, did not launch a major campaign to conquer Africa during the first two years of war. Two factors may have led Hitler to forego an African campaign and concentrate on other objectives. First, a large expeditionary force would be compelled to operate on extended supply lines across the Mediterranean, which would be exposed to attack by the British Navy and Air Force. Second, the economic advantages to be gained by occupying all of North Africa down to the equator would be far less than the resources gained by

occupying other areas within striking distance of German arms, especially European Russia. But whenever the Nazis find it possible to divert important forces from Russia, they may be expected to give serious consideration to a major campaign in Africa.

ALLIES CONTROL MOST OF AFRICA

To a large extent, the contest between the Axis and the Allies for control of Africa will be determined by the operation of extra-continental forces clashing in Europe and Asia as well as in Africa itself. Since the beginning of the imperialist struggle for Africa, the destiny of the "Dark Continent" has been governed by decisions in European capitals. Yet the attitude of the peoples—European and native—who inhabit Africa, their human and material resources, and the geography of their continent have an important bearing on the outcome of the conflict.

Africa, with the Allies holding the major portion of the continent and the Axis a much smaller area, is divided in its relationship to the conflict. Between the two groups of powers, there are important regions which are technically neutral but forced by their geographical position or the political orientation of their mother countries to gravitate toward either London or Berlin. Great Britain and its Allies control a block of territory extending from the Cape of Good Hope up the western side of the continent to the Sahara and up the eastern side to the Mediterranean. Within the Allied area, including scattered colonies and outlying islands, are found 71 per cent of Africa's population (57 per cent of its European population) and 55 per cent of its area. It cannot be claimed that many of these peoples elected freely to participate in the war, for only in the Union of South Africa was a declaration of war against the Axis contingent on the approval of a representative assembly.⁸ On the other hand, it should not be inferred that participation in the war does not receive popular support in non-self-governing territories.

After two years of war, the people of the *Union of South Africa* remain divided in their attitude toward the conflict. Participation in the war is supported by South Africans of British stock, representing 40 per cent of the population, and by approximately half of the Afrikaans-speaking descendants of Dutch settlers. Bitter opposition to the government's war policy is maintained by the

8. As a British Dominion, the Union possesses the independent power of making war and peace. See H. McD. Clokie, "The British Dominions and Neutrality," *American Political Science Review*, August 1940, pp. 737-49; R. B. Stewart, *Treaty Relationships of the British Commonwealth of Nations*. (New York, Macmillan, 1939), pp. 380 ff.

3. *Mein Kampf* (New York, Reynal and Hitchcock, 1940), pp. 178-79, 187-88, 891-92, 949-50.

4. P. B. Taylor, "Germany's Colonial Claims in Africa," *Foreign Policy Reports*, August 15, 1939, pp. 129-40. The German proposal inspired a number of publications in countries with African possessions which tended to refute German claims; see, e.g., Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Colonial Problem* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1937); *Germany's Claims to Colonies* (2nd edition, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939); L. S. Amery, *German Colonial Claims* (New York, Longmans, Green, 1940); A. L. C. Bullock, ed., *Germany's Colonial Demands* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1939).

5. V. M. Dean, "Italy's African Claims against France," *Foreign Policy Reports*, June 1, 1939, pp. 61-76; G. T. Garratt, *Mussolini's Roman Empire* (Indianapolis, Ind., Bobbs-Merrill, 1938).

6. For Axis schemes to settle European Jews in Madagascar, see Eugene Hevesi, "Hitler's Plans for Madagascar," *Contemporary Jewish Record*, August 1941, pp. 381-94.

7. J. C. Harsch, *Pattern of Conquest* (New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1941), pp. 206-11; Thomas Reveille, *The Spoil of Europe* (New York, Norton, 1941), pp. 52-59; K. H. Dietzel, "Imperialismus und Kolonialpolitik," *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, July 1940, pp. 313-22; August 1940, pp. 372-76.

nationalist wing of the Afrikaner element, numbering less than a third of the population. Their enmity to Britain, a heritage of the Boer wars reinforced recently by the introduction of economic, political and racial doctrines akin to Fascism, finds expression in their demands for peace with Germany and separation from the British commonwealth. The fundamental split in Union opinion, which was apparent at the outbreak of war,⁹ has continued with the proportions almost unchanged despite the subsequent invasion of the Netherlands and the Italian threat in East Africa. Anti-British sentiment has been demonstrated by acts of sabotage and rioting, culminating in a clash between soldiers and Afrikaner extremists in Johannesburg in February 1941, when 230 were injured.

The Union's war effort has been limited by the existence of this active minority. General (now Field Marshal) Jan C. Smuts, the Prime Minister, found it expedient to promise early in the conflict that the government would not conscript men for military service beyond the borders of South Africa, would not send any troops outside Africa, and would not participate in the Empire Air Training Scheme. The uneasy situation at home requires the presence of military units to maintain order. The government must avoid creating unrest which might result from severe economic dislocations. Nevertheless, the Union has put forth a remarkable war effort, training and equipping, partly from its own resources, an army, air force, and small navy. South African units contributed heavily to the East African campaign, and since June 1941 have been stationed on the Libyan front. Meanwhile Smuts, himself an Afrikaner, has attempted to persuade rather than force the opposition to acquiesce in the war program, although it was found necessary to take police action against the Ossewa Brandwag, a semi-military Afrikaner organization; against other Nazi sympathizers; and against German colonists in South Africa's mandated territory of *South West Africa*.¹⁰ The power of the opposition has been further weakened by division within the ranks.¹¹ If Britain collapsed, however, there would be a strong incentive to armed uprisings in South Africa.¹²

9. The United Kingdom's declaration of war on September 3, 1939 precipitated a political crisis in South Africa. When the Prime Minister, General James B. M. Hertzog, proposed a policy of neutrality on September 4, he and his Fusion government were overthrown. Jan C. Smuts and a pro-war Cabinet then took office. See J. F. Green, "The British Dominions at War," *Foreign Policy Reports*, February 1, 1940, pp. 282-83.

10. There were 9,600 Germans, a third of the European population, in South West Africa in 1939. Most of them were fanatical Nazis. See Negley Farson, *Behind God's Back* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1941), pp. 20-28, 58-67.

11. *The Times* (London), April 12, 1941.

British colonies, protectorates, and mandated territories in Africa were brought automatically into the war alongside Great Britain. The Europeans in these territories, of whom the most influential are the British officials, traders and planters, stand almost solidly against the Nazis. The natives who form the overwhelming majority in the British territories have limited powers and meager opportunities of forming and expressing opinions on the war. Among the articulate natives, however, there is a marked, and apparently genuine, enthusiasm for assisting in the conflict, qualified by some impatience with Britain's slow progress in carrying out political, social and economic reforms. The search for a satisfactory solution of the "colonial problem," which provoked much discussion but few concrete results in the two decades between wars,¹³ has been going forward in Britain during the present conflict. Numerous organizations and individuals have formulated programs for immediate changes as well as far-reaching reforms in the colonial empire.¹⁴ The British government, which has been reluctant to define its "peace aims" and specify in detail its plans for a post-war world, has enunciated no comprehensive schemes for colonial reform after the war, although it has made a beginning by creating a small committee in the Colonial Office to study long-range economic policies for the colonies.¹⁵ The natives appear convinced that improvement will come, albeit slowly, under the democracies, but never under the dictatorships.¹⁶

12. L. L. Isley, "The War Policy of South Africa," *American Political Science Review*, December 1940, pp. 1178-87; G. H. Calpin, "South Africa at War," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1941, pp. 458-61; "South Africa," *Round Table*, March 1941, pp. 367-77, June 1941, pp. 591-612; A. Brady, "Political Parties and Nationalism in South Africa," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, January 1941, pp. 139-52; *The Scotsman* (Edinburgh), January 8, 1941.

13. See, e.g., the monumental report by Lord Hailey, *An African Survey* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1938).


14. The National Delegate Conference on Civil Liberties in the Colonial Empire, with representatives of 211 organizations present, met in early 1941 and discussed a wide variety of reforms; *Manchester Guardian*, February 17, 1941. The Colonial Bureau of the Fabian Society has also embarked on a study of the colonial problem; see *The Empire*, published by the Bureau. Proposals from individuals for colonial reform are set forth in: Norman Bentwich, *The Colonial Problem and the Federal Solution* (London, Macmillan, 1941); W. M. Macmillan, *Democratise the Empire* (London, Kegan Paul, 1941); Lord Lugard, *Federation and the Colonies* (London, Macmillan, 1941).

15. Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, July 9, 1941, vol. 119, no. 56, cols. 698-730; *New Statesman and Nation*, July 19, 1941.

16. "This is not a white man's war; nor is it a war between Germany and Great Britain; it is a war between two systems of life—Nazism and Democracy. In taking part in it on the side of Democracy, we shall be defending a way of life in which there is a great future for our race." *Bantu World* (Johannesburg), January 18, 1941. This newspaper is published by and for the Bantu peoples of South Africa. See the *Colonial News*

Hostility to the Axis is based on knowledge of the ill-treatment meted out by Germany to natives in its pre-1914 colonies,¹⁷ and by Italy to the Libyans;¹⁸ on Hitler's profound contempt for the Negro race; and on resentment over Mussolini's conquest of Ethiopia. Natives of British territories have made many voluntary contributions, often in kind, to Britain's war effort. The African colonial administrations contributed grants from government funds of £2,001,900 (\$8,087,000) to the United Kingdom, and public subscriptions of various types amount to perhaps 50 per cent more.¹⁹

The British position in Africa is strengthened by the adherence of the Belgian Congo, French equatorial territories, and Ethiopia to the Allied cause. When Germany attacked Belgium, the Belgian Congo and the Belgian mandated territory of *Ruanda-Urundi*, a small thickly populated area in the equatorial highlands,²⁰ were placed on a war footing. Since the recognized Belgian government was transferred intact from Brussels to London, there was no interruption in its sovereignty over the Congo. While there was a short period of uncertainty in Leopoldville, the colonial administration remained loyal to the government. The Minister for Colonies in the refugee Belgian Cabinet was en-



trusted on June 18, 1940 with almost dictatorial powers over the colony. An army of 100,000, with trained native troops and European officers, has been raised and equipped with British and American aid. Thirty thousand effectives were sent overland through central Africa to take part in the Ethiopian campaign and are now in Egypt. The adherence of the Congo gives the Free Belgian movement a territorial foundation, substantial economic resources, and a base from which a distinct Belgian force, cooperating with the other Allies, can take part in the war against the Nazis.²¹

The political allegiance of *French Equatorial Africa*, with the adjoining French mandated territory of the *Camerouns*, hung in the balance for two months after the fall of the Third Republic. General Charles de Gaulle's radio appeal of June 18, 1940 for the formation of a Free French force to continue the struggle was first answered in Africa by M. Felix Eboué, Negro governor of Chad colony, who proclaimed his adherence on August 26. Within two days, the other colonies in

Bulletin (monthly, Colonial Department, Institute of Education, University of London) for translations and synopses of articles from the African native press, especially the *Bantu World*, the *West African Pilot* (Nigeria), the *Baraza* (Kenya), and the *Bulawayo Chronicle* (Southern Rhodesia).

17. G. L. Steer, *Judgment on German Africa* (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1939); G. Padmore, *How Britain Rules Africa* (New York, Lothrop, Lee, 1936), pp. 58-61, 276-77, 280-85; Farson, *Behind God's Back*, cited, pp. 234-517. But cf. H. R. Rudin, *Germans in the Cameroons, 1884-1914* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1938).

18. *The Italian Colonial Empire* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1940), pp. 10-11; Margaret Boveri, *Mediterranean Cross-Currents* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1938), pp. 277-82.

19. *Crown Colonist* (London), August 1941, p. 273. See also Sir H. Brittain, *Come the Three Corners* (London, Hutchinson, 1940); W. E. Simnett, "Britain's Colonies in the War," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1941, pp. 655-64.

20. *Ibid.*, August 1941, p. 273.

21. See *News from Belgium* (weekly, New York, Belgian Information Center); Max Horn, "The Belgian Congo in the War," *Belgium* (New York), vol. 1, no. 1, 1941, pp. 19 ff.; A. de Vleeschauwer (Minister for Colonies), "Belgium's War Policy in the Congo," *ibid.*, vol. 1, no. 3, 1941, pp. 37-38.

French Equatorial Africa, except Gabun, and the Cameroons joined de Gaulle. Military action in Gabun compelled pro-Vichy officials to yield, and Free French control over a territory five times the size of France, but including some of the least developed of African land,²² is now complete. It is the largest area governed by de Gaulle's Council for the Defense of the Empire, organized on October 27, 1940²³ and recognized by the British as the *de facto* government of all Free French territories.²⁴ While the seat of the Free French National Council, formed on September 23, 1941, is at London, the capital of French Equatorial Africa—Brazzaville—has become an important center of de Gaullist activity, and the surrounding region a base for forces operating against the Axis in East Africa and the Sahara Desert.²⁵

The Allied forces in East Africa also received valuable assistance from the Emperor of Ethiopia and native bands, some of which were never subdued during the Italian occupation. The British government, having withdrawn its recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia,²⁶ stated on February 4, 1941 that it would "welcome the appearance of an independent Ethiopian state and recognize the claim of Emperor Hailie Selassie to the throne."^{26a} But although the Emperor has been in Addis Ababa since May 5, he has not been recognized as the legitimate sovereign and is not represented in Allied government councils in London.^{26b} Meanwhile he governs with British "guidance and control." This veiled protectorate will probably continue until the end of the war, when the British government will seek an international arrangement providing the necessary outside assistance and guidance for the Ethiopian government.²⁷ The other portions of Italian East Africa—the former colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland—are under British military occupation.

22. The foreign trade of the Free French territories, with more than twice the area of the British West African colonies, was only one-twelfth that of the British group in 1938.

23. *Journal Officiel de la France Libre* (London), January 20, 1941, p. 3.

24. *Ibid.* The United States has not recognized the de Gaulle Council as either the *de facto* or *de jure* government of the Free French territories, although de Gaulle's representatives have invited such recognition. *New York Herald Tribune*, September 24, 1941. René Cassin, "Vichy or Free France?" *Foreign Affairs*, October 1941, pp. 101-12.

25. *Ibid.*; B. L. Burman, "Paris Moves to the Congo," *Living Age*, July 1941, pp. 409-12. P.-H. Sirix, "The Free French Colonies," *National Review* (London), February 1941, pp. 179-89.

26. *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, August 13, 1940, vol. 117, col. 304.

26a. *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, February 4, 1941, vol. 368, col. 804.

26b. *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, April 30, 1941, vol. 371, col. 409; May 19, vol. 371, col. 1187; July 1, vol. 372, cols. 1223-24.

The elimination of Fascist bases in these areas, which dominate the southern end of the Red Sea, has insured the safety of the shipping route to Suez. Although the independent kingdom of Egypt, occupying a highly strategic position in northeast Africa, is technically neutral, it is bound by the Treaty of Alliance with Britain (1936) to permit British use of its territory and facilities for military purposes. A minority of Egyptians has attempted to bring the country into the war as an ally of Great Britain, but thus far the Chamber of Deputies and the people have refused to take this course, despite Axis bombings which have killed almost a thousand persons.²⁸

The only African territory now completely controlled by the Axis is the Italian colony of Libya, with an area of 680,000 square miles, of which only 2.5 per cent in the Mediterranean littoral is arable land. One of the primary aims of the Fascist colonization program was to strengthen Italy's military position in North Africa, and by the outbreak of war over 100,000 Italians had been settled in Libya to serve as the nucleus of a local military force.²⁹ Italian control over the war-like nomads was not achieved until General Graziani's "pacification" campaign ended in 1932.

The remaining colonial territories in Africa, held by Vichy France, Spain and Portugal, are neutral in status, although in some areas Axis infiltration is reported to be going steadily forward. The Vichy government controls *French North Africa*, which includes Algeria, an integral part of France under the Third Republic; the Regency of Tunisia; and the French Zone of Morocco. *French West Africa* is a federation of seven colonies—Senegal, French Sudan, French Guinea, Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Mauritania and Niger—under a governor-general stationed at Dakar, Senegal. With the mandated territory of Togo, French West Africa has an area of 1,836,000 square miles, sparsely populated by 15,441,000 persons.³⁰ The entire administration of French North and West Africa was entrusted to General Maxime Weygand as delegate-general of the Vichy régime on October 5, 1940, and all local governing bodies were abolished.

27. *Ibid.* For discussion of the future government and reconstruction of Ethiopia, see "Abyssinia," *Statist*, May 17, 1941; "The Future of Abyssinia," *New Statesman and Nation*, February 22, 1941, pp. 176-77; *New Times and Ethiopia News* (weekly, London); C. Gwynn, "The Future of Italian East Africa," *Fortnightly* (London), June 1941, pp. 532-36.

28. L. E. Frechtling, "The War in the Eastern Mediterranean," *Foreign Policy Reports*, February 1, 1941, pp. 276-79; M. E. Randolph, "Egypt Faces War," *Harper's*, February 1941, pp. 313-23; Pierre Crabitès, "Britain's Debt to King Farouk," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1941, pp. 852-60.

29. *The Italian Colonial Empire*, cited, pp. 30-32.

30. *The French Colonial Empire* (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1940), pp. 7-10.

The politico-military situation in Vichy's African domains is exceedingly difficult to evaluate, for not only interpretations but also factual information on events and tendencies there differ widely. The Vichy government and Weygand affirm their intention to preserve the integrity of what remains of the French empire and to defend it against attack from every side. They readily admit that German and Italian agents circulate widely from Tunis to Morocco, but maintain that they are only members of the armistice commissions supervising the disarmament of French troops, the dismantling of fortifications in Tunisia along the Libyan border, and the demilitarization of naval bases. They deny that Axis infiltration has progressed to a point where Weygand's independence of action is compromised and assert, furthermore, that supplies from North Africa do not reach the Axis. The State Department in Washington, apparently finding that Vichy's description of the situation agrees with reports from numerous observers in Africa, opened a limited trade with French Moroccan ports in June 1941. It persuaded the British to relax the blockade and permit the passage of ships carrying petroleum, farm machinery, coal and consumption goods.³¹ The intention seems to be to strengthen Weygand's military forces and keep the natives supplied with goods, in the hope that North Africa will be placed in a condition in which it can actively resist German attempts to assume control over the region.

On the other hand, the British government, the Free French, and most of the travelers who have left Vichy-controlled Africa report that several thousand German "tourists" have quietly established themselves at most of the strategic ports and airfields, that the Axis has been stirring up the natives against the French,³² and that most of the agricultural exports of North Africa have been appropriated by Axis agents.³³ Many of these observers doubt that Weygand would oppose the Nazis contrary to the wishes of Marshal Pétain.

Against this background of conflicting testimony, several observations appear warranted. The African territories will probably share the fate of unoccupied France, for if the "collaborationists" triumph at Vichy, Weygand would be unable to take

an independent stand. All his important subordinates have been investigated, and those suspected of pro-British sympathies have been replaced by appointees of Admiral Jean Darlan.³⁴ If Hitler decides to abandon diplomatic persuasion and use force against Vichy, the African forces would be unable to put up effective resistance, since their supplies are meager and their defenses reduced. Meanwhile the Vichy government has yielded to German pressure to the extent of admitting numerous Axis officers to North Africa and embarking on the construction of defensive works and railroads which can be used only against the Allies. In North Africa the passage of time seems to be working in favor of the Axis.

Several other French African territories have remained loyal to Vichy, although their importance is limited. *French Somaliland* has refused demands of the British to surrender, despite increasingly desperate conditions brought about by the British blockade. *Madagascar* and *Réunion*, islands in the Indian Ocean, have likewise declared for Vichy.

In the political strategy of northwest Africa, the Spanish possessions play an important role. The Spanish zone of *Morocco*, a narrow strip of land opposite the British fortress of Gibraltar, has been recently enlarged by the incorporation of the city and excellent harbor of Tangier. By the Act of Algeciras (1906), Tangier was made a neutralized and demilitarized international zone,³⁵ but on June 14, 1940 the Franco government took advantage of the Allies' preoccupation to send troops into Tangier and on November 3 abolished the international administration.³⁶ This was the first concrete expression of the imperialistic ambitions of the Franco government, which are further confirmed by heavy troop movements from Spain into Morocco, suggesting the possibility of further action in cooperation with the Axis. Thus far, General Franco's concern for his country, exhausted after three years of civil war, and his apprehension over the results of admitting the Nazi army into Spain have kept that nation out of the world conflict. The possibility remains, however, that Spanish forces in Africa may take part in a general drive against the Allies.^{36a} Spain possesses *Rio de Oro* and *Ifni* on the Atlantic Coast. The absence of good harbors and the pov-

31. During the first three months of operation, Washington made \$12,000,000 in blocked funds available to the French for purchases in this country. The State Department intends to release supplies at the rate of \$50,000,000 annually, it was unofficially reported. *New York Herald Tribune*, September 24, 1941.

32. W. E. Lucas, *Christian Science Monitor*, October 4, 1941.

33. See statements of Prime Minister Churchill, *The New York Times*, April 10, 1941; Hugh Dalton, Minister of Economic Warfare, *ibid.*, August 1, October 1, 1941.

34. *New York Herald Tribune*, August 28, 1941.

35. G. H. Stuart, *The International City of Tangier* (Stanford University, Cal., Stanford University Press, 1931).

36. "The Status of Tangier," *Bulletin of International News*, December 14, 1940, pp. 1618-20; G. Delore, "The Violation by Spain of the Statute of Tangier," *American Journal of International Law*, January 1941, pp. 140-45.

36a. "Spain and the New Order," *The Economist*, January 25, 1941, pp. 96-97; W. H. Carter, "Spain and the Axis," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1941, pp. 175-83.

erty of these colonies make them of little value. The *Canary* archipelago, 60 miles offshore, and extending 300 miles westward into the Atlantic, has several good harbors which are used principally as coaling stations.

Portugal also possesses important islands lying off the west coast of Africa. The *Cape Verde* group consists of 15 islands lying 400 to 500 miles west of Dakar, with an important port at St. Vincent. *Madeira*, with the harbor of Funchal, is located north of the Canary Islands.³⁷ *Portuguese Guinea*, in the "bulge" of West Africa, is enclosed on the land side by French territory. Recently Bolama, the capital, has been used as an alternate terminus for planes crossing the south Atlantic. *Angola* on the west coast of southern Africa and *Mozambique* on the east coast are of primary importance to British and Belgian central African territories, since most of their foreign trade is carried on the Portuguese railways reaching the sea at Lobito, Beira and Lourenço Marques. While Portugal is subject to a mild form of dictatorship under Dr. Oliveira Salazar, with a one-party authoritarian government sympathetic to the Franco government in Madrid, the country's 600-year-old alliance with Great Britain and its vulnerability to British sea power have so far kept it out of the Nazi orbit. Allusions by President Roosevelt and Senator Claude Pepper to the necessity of forestalling German occupation of Portugal's Atlantic islands drew a sharp protest from Lisbon on May 30, 1941.³⁸ The Portuguese government has vowed to preserve its neutrality and has strengthened colonial garrisons to enforce this policy, but its position in the face of strong Axis pressure would be difficult.³⁹

Liberia, the black republic peopled partly by descendants of freed American slaves, adjoins British Sierra Leone and French West Africa. The absence of any harbor on the 350-mile coast has limited its commercial importance, although it may soon be made a stop on the Pan American air route to the Near East. By virtue of its historical ties with the United States and its commercial connections, particularly through the Firestone rubber plantation, Liberia is regarded as an unofficial ward of Washington.⁴⁰

37. A. T. Caudill, "Portugal and the Atlantic Islands," *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, May 31, 1941, pp. 363 ff.

38. *The New York Times*, June 13, 1941; *Bulletin of Political, Economic and Cultural Information* (Lisbon), June 30, 1941, pp. 2-3.

39. Portugal's position will be discussed at greater length in a forthcoming issue of *Foreign Policy Reports* by A. Randle Elliott.

40. H. W. Newman, "Liberia," *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, September 6, 1941, pp. 9 ff.; J. C. Young, *Liberia Rediscovered* (New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1934); William Koren, Jr., "Liberia, the League and the United States," *Foreign Policy Reports*, November 21, 1934, pp. 239-48.

AFRICAN RESOURCES COMPARATIVELY SMALL

Contrary to popular conception, Africa is not a continent richly endowed with natural resources or an important contributor to the world's production of wealth. In 1938 Africa contributed 3 per cent of the world's primary production. Only Oceania, with 2.9 per cent, ranked lower among the continents.⁴¹ Africa accounted for 7 per cent of the world's trade in the same year, indicating that, on balance, a large share of its wealth was shipped abroad.⁴² Almost all of Africa's population lives near the bare subsistence level. In Algeria and Egypt the average real income per person approaches 20 per cent of that in the United States, while the rest of the territories are still poorer.⁴³ A combination of factors are responsible for this condition. Large areas, especially the Sahara and tropical coastal regions, are unsuitable for agricultural production, and economically exploitable mineral deposits are few. In many sections there is a real shortage of man power; with 23 per cent of the world's area, Africa has only 7 per cent of its population. The economic policies of the colonial powers have discouraged the industrialization of Africa, with the result that heavy industry is found only in South Africa and light industry in Algeria, and Southern Rhodesia.

Quantitatively, Africa can contribute little to the economic effort of the warring powers. In certain categories of minerals, however, its production is important. Chrome ore mined in Southern Rhodesia can easily cover the Allies' requirements. A liberal supply of two valuable steel alloys, manganese and vanadium, is available from mines on the Gold Coast and in Southern Africa. Copper produced in Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo supplements American and Canadian output. The same areas are the world's principal sources of cobalt, required in the making of very hard steels for toolmaking, etc. The tin mines of Nigeria and the Belgian Congo are the closest source of United Kingdom imports of the white metal. Diamonds are virtually a monopoly of South Africa and the Congo. While the production of gem stones has been curtailed, industrial diamonds are much in demand. The gold from South African mines has little industrial value, but as long as the

41. *Raw Materials and Foodstuffs* (Geneva, League of Nations, 1939), pp. 11-14. Africa's production of foodstuffs amounted to 2.4 per cent; of raw materials, 4.5 per cent, of which the most important category was metallic minerals (9 per cent).

42. *Europe's Trade* (Geneva, League of Nations, 1941), p. 9.

43. Average real income per head calculated in international units for the period 1925-34: United States, 1,381; Algeria and Egypt, 300; Union of South Africa, Belgian Congo, Rhodesia, Spanish Morocco and Tunis, 300-200; rest of Africa, below 200. Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress* (London, Macmillan, 1940), p. 54.

United States Treasury purchases the metal, it is a valuable export article for the Union.

The British and French colonies on the west African coast usually export large quantities of vegetable oil seeds and nuts (peanuts, sesamum, palm oil and palm kernels), and cocoa. Although these are the only foodstuffs produced in significant quantities in Africa, they are not indispensable. Coconuts, soya beans and animal fats are suitable substitutes for the African products and are available to the Allies in sufficient quantity. Cocoa is classed as a "luxury" article, which is not vital in Allied diets and may in any case be obtained from the Caribbean. South Africa exports sizable quantities of wool, cereals and sugar cane. It is significant that all the above raw materials and foodstuffs are produced south of the Sahara, and a great majority south of the Equator. Control of northern Africa by the Axis would not, therefore, seriously impair the economic potential of the Allied territories.

Outside the Allied sphere, there is only one important producing area—French North Africa. Comparatively small quantities of grain, wines and vegetables are normally exported to France. This region produces over 30 per cent of the world's output of natural phosphates used as fertilizer and in the chemical industry, and 3 per cent of the world's iron ore. Under the Vichy government, French North Africa has been exporting foodstuffs and phosphates to Marseilles, where a considerable portion is appropriated by German and Italian officials.

Despite their domination of all Europe except Russia and the British Isles, the Nazis still lack many raw materials and foodstuffs to supply industry on the continent. In view of this fact, it is interesting to note that Germany's economic position would be strengthened little, if at all, by the conquest of North Africa. In the lands bordering the Mediterranean from Morocco to Suez, the Nazis would find only 2.2 per cent of their requirements of grain, 30 per cent in cotton, 6 per cent in wool, and 50 per cent in phosphates. Besides the shortages indicated, the "New Order" would still lack rubber, petroleum, many non-ferrous metals and most foodstuffs.⁴⁴

The Allies' overwhelming advantage in holding most of the potentially valuable producing areas in Africa does not of itself assure victory, however. Its resources must first be translated into effective weapons and supplies. As at home and elsewhere

44. See Cleona Lewis, *Nazi Europe and World Trade* (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1941), *passim*, especially pp. 23, 62, 66, 102. Statistics are based on 1937 trade figures and do not take into account subsequent changes in capacity to produce and consume.

in their dominions, the Allied powers were slow to organize their African territories for total war. Reorientation of Africa's production for war was, however, speeded up after June 1940, and is gradually but appreciably adding to the actual striking power of the Allied armies. The objectives of the Allied (predominantly British) economic program for Africa outside the Union are three: to insure the continued production and transportation of essential foodstuffs and raw materials from the colonies; to keep any materials from getting to Nazi Europe; and to sustain as far as possible the normal economic life of the African peoples. The last-named objective indicates a special problem found particularly in tropical Africa, where the entire economic system is based on the export of a few products such as cocoa, vegetable seeds and oils, and cotton. The British blockade cut off these products from many of their ordinary markets, and the world-wide shipping shortage intensified the problem.⁴⁵ Imports of manufactured goods were seriously curtailed in many colonies, thus diminishing the customs revenues of the colonial governments. Meanwhile, public expenditure for defense had risen. The administrators of many African territories, except those with industries or mining works, were faced with serious difficulties which might affect popular morale. The British government sought a partial solution of the problem by engaging to purchase large quantities and in some cases the entire crop of West African cocoa and bananas, East African sisal, cotton and cotton products from Egypt and East Africa, and sugar from Mauritius and East Africa. Wherever possible, these products are then sold on empire and world markets, but lack of shipping space has compelled British officials to store or even burn them.⁴⁶ While the operation of the plan has aroused criticism among African planters, their position appears better than in other "black spots" in Britain's colonial empire.⁴⁷

As a further means of relieving the colonies, Britain put into operation, after a year's delay due to the war, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. This measure provides £5,000,000

45. In 1937 all Africa sent more than half of its exports to and obtained almost half of its imports from countries now under Nazi domination. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

46. For a review of the operation of the commodity purchasing scheme, see the statement of George Hall, Colonial Under-Secretary, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, July 9, 1941, vol. 373, no. 82, cols. 157-59. The difficulties caused by shipping shortage is well illustrated in Egypt where the British Cotton Buying Commission purchased 1,454,000 bales of cotton from September 15, 1940 to May 31, 1941, and exported only 531,000 bales. *Foreign Crops and Markets*, August 11, 1941, p. 150.

47. "Colonial Black Spots," *The Economist*, February 22, 1941, pp. 236-37.

annually from the United Kingdom Treasury for the financing of agricultural and industrial projects and social services, which will raise the living standards of the colonial peoples. In addition, £500,000 is to be expended annually for colonial research. Although the amounts appropriated appear to be insufficient for the desired objectives,⁴⁸ the Act is notable as an indication of Britain's assumption of responsibility for promoting the welfare of the colonies. Instead of insisting that each colony should finance its own schemes for social and economic improvement, the United Kingdom will give substantial aid.⁴⁹

Coordination of wartime economic policies in the British African dependencies with those of the Free French and Belgian colonies has been secured through a series of agreements, the character of which is indicated by the *accord* of May 20, 1941, between the British government and General de Gaulle with respect to French Equatorial Africa. The colonial government agrees to furnish the British with specified quantities of cotton, rubber and wood. London promises to purchase coffee, vegetable oils, and oil-seeds which would not otherwise find a market. The Free French currency is linked to the pound sterling, and all external financial operations of the colonial government are to be conducted under the supervision of the British Treasury.⁵⁰ The government of Egypt, acting at the suggestion of British authorities, has likewise integrated its external financial and economic policies with those of the Allies.

The difficulties involved in directing from London the manifold economic activities of the British Commonwealth have made necessary the establishment of regional organizations to promote local coordination and planning. British territories in southern and eastern Africa were

represented at the Eastern Group Supply Conference which met at Delhi, India, from October 25 to November 25, 1940. Delegates from British countries bordering on the Indian Ocean discussed methods of making their area as self-sufficient as possible, particularly in war materials, thus reducing the pressure on Britain for supplies.⁵¹ On a smaller scale, the British dependencies in East Africa are striving to attain the same objective through an Economic Council formed at Nairobi, Kenya, on August 6, 1940.⁵²

The contribution made by most of Allied-controlled Africa to the common war effort is restricted to raw materials and foodstuffs. Only in the Union of South Africa are there factories for transforming natural resources into military weapons. At the beginning of the war, South Africa had a large explosives industry and a state small arms ammunition works, but no equipment to produce weapons, vehicles and other essential munitions and few reserves on hand. Industrial plants were rapidly converted to war production in 1940 and, with the addition of new units built by the War Supply Board, over 600 factories are now making war materials. Sixty-five types of armored and transport vehicles on chassis imported from North America are now produced; part of the armored car output has been delivered to the British Army. Munitions works turn out shells, aerial bombs, hand grenades, and an export surplus of small arms ammunition.^{52a} Medium-calibre guns are produced in Africa for the first time. The Union is still dependent on outside sources for airplanes, heavy guns and motors. On the other hand, South Africa has shipped to Allied forces an average of 100,000 wool blankets and 125,000 pairs of shoes each month.⁵³

Additional factories in South Africa can increase the output of war supplies to a limited extent, but the difficulties of establishing large-scale industries in wartime with a restricted supply of skilled labor will prevent any sensational rise in South Africa's production. Allied forces on African battlefronts must therefore continue to rely on supplies transported from Great Britain, the Brit-

48. By the middle of 1941, 24 development schemes, involving an expenditure of £380,000 over a period of years, had been approved for the whole colonial empire. Lord Moyne, Colonial Secretary, *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, July 9, 1941, vol. 119, col. 714. A. Creech Jones, "The Colonies in the War," *Political Quarterly*, October-December 1940, pp. 384-95; "Colonial Black Spots," cited.

49. *Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare* (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1940), Cmd. 6175; *Despatch . . . to the Colonial Governments regarding Certain Aspects of Colonial Policy in War-Time* (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1941), Cmd. 6299; "Wartime Policy in British Colonial Dependencies," *International Labour Review*, March 1941, pp. 299-308.

50. "Accord conclu le 20 mai 1941 par le Général de Gaulle . . . avec le Gouvernement de S. M. britannique dans le Royaume-Uni, facilitant les échanges commerciaux entre l'Afrique Equatoriale française et le Royaume-Uni," *Journal Officiel de la France Libre*, June 16, 1941, p. 28. For a similar agreement with respect to the Cameroons, see *ibid.*, February 25, 1941, p. 12. Agreements covering Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi are summarized in Baron R. E. Silvercruys, "Belgium and the Congo's War Effort," *Belgium*, vol. 1, no. 6, 1941, pp. 38-40; *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, May 3, 1941, pp. 190-91.

51. The conference established a continuing Council to carry out its scheme. "The Delhi Conference," *Bulletin of International News*, November 2, 1940, pp. 1416-18; November 16, pp. 1475-77; November 30, pp. 1550-52; December 14, pp. 1613-17.

52. British Ministry of Information, *Release*, August 6, 1940. Donald Cowie ("Towards A Regional Empire," *Political Quarterly*, April-June 1941, pp. 214-22) believes that these groupings will condition the future organization of the empire.

52a. Factories in the neighboring colony of Southern Rhodesia are making component parts used in South African munitions. British Ministry of Information, *Release*, April 30, 1941.

53. "South Africa," *Round Table*, June 1941, pp. 591-601; British Ministry of Information, *Release*, April 30, 1941; *Inter-Allied Review*, February 1941.

ish Dominions, and the United States to the ports of Freetown, Bathurst, Lagos, Duala and Porte Noire on the west coast; Capetown and Durban in South Africa; and Suez in Egypt.

THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF AFRICA

There are two strategical east-west zones within which the Allies expected to organize their defense of Africa against invasion from Europe—the Mediterranean Sea and the Sahara Desert. The first line was breached, however, when France capitulated, thereby depriving the British of the cooperation of the French Navy and the use of important Mediterranean bases at Oran and Bizerta in North Africa and Toulon in southern France. The British were left with a reduced fleet forced to operate from Gibraltar at the western end of the inland ocean and Alexandria near the eastern end. Although the Royal Navy has been able to move large convoys through the Mediterranean and to intercept some Italian vessels plying between Italy and Libya, it does not dominate the middle section of the Mediterranean. This was demonstrated in March 1941 when strong German armored units were transported to Libya and rolled back Wavell's army. The British Navy and Air Force do enjoy superiority in the eastern Mediterranean, thus preventing a German attack on Egypt by sea and supporting the Allied forces which hold the approaches to Suez in Syria and western Egypt. General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Allied commander in the Middle East, is reported to have massed 400,000 men to guard Egypt against an Axis thrust from Libya. His army needs replacements of tanks, planes and heavy arms, much of which was lost in the Greek, Cretan and Libyan retreats.

West of Egypt, the North African coast is open to the Axis. New contingents of German and Italian troops are replacing those drawn from Libya for the Russian campaign. Axis penetration of the French and Spanish possessions in North Africa appears well advanced, although no uniformed troops have been introduced. The significance of this movement is not measured in terms of resources or man power gained for the Nazi "New Order." Algeria and Morocco are important as a bridgehead on the southern shore of the Mediterranean from which campaigns can be launched against Allied positions elsewhere in Africa. Directly southward from the Mediterranean, the Sahara Desert interposes a barrier to the passage of all except small, lightly armored military units. The only feasible and strategically valuable advance which the Axis can make is down the west side of Africa toward Cape Verde, the westernmost part of the continent. From Tangier, it is 150 miles along the coast to the strong French

naval base of Casablanca, heavily defended and garrisoned, and linked by direct rail and road connections with Algeria. Southward from Casablanca there is no port of importance until Dakar is reached, 1,375 miles away.

The port of Dakar has long been an important shipping center, both as an outlet for the trade of West Africa and as a coaling station for South African shipping.^{53a} With the advent of transatlantic flying, Dakar became the principal African springboard for planes crossing to Brazil. In 1938 the French began to expand rapidly the naval base at Dakar. The base is now equipped with a dry-dock, coal and oil storage facilities, a large arsenal, and new jetties which enlarge the protected harbor area. Dakar possesses natural defenses, which have been utilized for the mounting of heavy guns. Because of its strategic position and powerful protection, Dakar has been called the "Gibraltar of Africa." It is reported, however, that at present the garrison is small and equipment, planes and ammunition are meager.⁵⁴ About 100 miles south of Dakar lies Bathurst, British Gambia. A small harbor and difficult climatic conditions combine to make it of secondary importance. But at Freetown, Sierra Leone, 400 miles farther southward, the British possess a good deep-water harbor surrounded by stony defense works. Although it can serve as a supporting base for smaller naval vessels, it is not equipped to handle heavy concentrations of ships. Freetown is the headquarters of the British General commanding West African forces, and the assembly point for convoys proceeding northward to the British Isles. There are no other important southern ports with the possible exception of Abijan, in the French Ivory Coast colony, where Vichy is improving "one of the most secure natural harbors in the world."^{54a} Construction, however, must necessarily be slow.

Three island groups lying off the African mainland are an integral part of the strategical situation of West Africa. The Cape Verde Islands, 300 miles out in the Atlantic from Dakar, are located close to the main ocean routes, but local conditions restrict their military usefulness. There are only two small ports in the archipelago, neither of which could serve as a naval station; the water supply is inadequate, and atmospheric conditions make

53a. Dakar was the French Republic's third busiest port, following Marseilles and Le Havre. Shipping in 1937 totaled 17,592,000 tons. P. K. Roest, "French West Africa," *Foreign Agriculture*, September 1941, pp. 353-96.

54. Derwent Whittlesey, "Dakar and the Other Cape Verde Settlements," *Geographical Review*, October 1941, pp. 609-38; Hanson Baldwin, *The New York Times*, July 21, 22, 1941. J. S. Vidarte, "De Gaulle at Dakar," *The Nation*, February 21, 1941, pp. 205-07. Marc Slonim, *New York Post*, October 1, 1941.

54a. *New York Herald Tribune*, September 13, 1941.

flying difficult for long periods. The Canary Islands possess somewhat better harbors, especially at Tenerife and Las Palmas, where considerable transshipping and fueling of vessels is carried on. The lack of naval facilities and the location of the islands only 60 miles from a barren coast, detract from their value. Madeira, less than 600 miles from Gibraltar, also has no first-class port. None of the islands, therefore, is suitable as a naval base, although they could be used as stations serving submarines and commerce raiders. Taken in conjunction with Dakar, however, the islands off the west African coast form a strategical unit dominating the south Atlantic.⁵⁵

The natural approach to the Dakar region from Europe is by sea but, as long as the British Navy is intact, the sea route is closed to the Axis. The alternative approach, by land, is very difficult. There are several motor tracks running across the 1,500 miles of desert between Dakar and the settled section of North Africa, but it is impossible to transport men, matériel and supplies such a distance by road. Since 1879 the French have planned the construction of a trans-Sahara railway linking the West African colonies with the Mediterranean coast. Along the trace proposed, it is 2,120 miles from Oran via the upper Niger region to Dakar; today a gap of 1,500 miles exists between the Moroccan and West African systems. The Vichy government decreed on March 22, 1941 that construction be resumed.⁵⁶ Laborers, mostly Spanish refugees, are now working on the railroad under terrific hardship. The physical difficulties to be overcome are great and steel rails scarce, so that even German experts do not expect the completion of the trans-Saharan line short of several years. Every additional mile of track, however, facilitates Vichy and Nazi penetration of Africa.⁵⁷

British command of the seas gives the Allies an advantage in the contest for Africa. While it may be possible for the Axis to begin a major campaign in Africa without first reducing the British Navy, the assault may be preceded by an air and land offensive against Gibraltar and Alexandria. If the Nazi drive succeeds, the Allies would be thrown back on their second line of defense, stretching east and west from Nigeria across French

Equatorial Africa to the Sudan and the Red Sea. Transportation systems, both rail and road, in these areas are superior to those farther north and would give the Allied armies greater mobility. On the other hand, the Allies are still short of trained men and modern equipment. The principal African contribution is from the Union, which has 150,000 men under arms and an air force of 25,000. Elsewhere in Africa, the forces are composed of native troops led by European officers—the Royal West African Frontier Force, the King's African Rifles from East Africa, and smaller forces from other colonies. Belgian and Free French armies are being trained and equipped in their respective colonies. Units from most of the Allied territories took part in the East African campaign, but they compose only a fraction of the first-line troops which could meet the Axis armies with a reasonable chance of victory.

CONCLUSION

The Allies and the Axis are contending, not for the control of Africa *per se*, but for possession of key points on the periphery of the continent which command approaches to more distant parts of the earth. Egypt and the Suez Canal hold an important place in the strategy of Asia, now forming the left flank of the Allied front in the Middle East. If the Germans push into Egypt, they are well on the road to Iran and India. The western bulge of Africa and the outlying islands would constitute a valuable point of departure for Nazi penetration of South America. Dakar, farther west than eastern Iceland, is only 1,619 sea miles from Natal, Brazil, and closer to that point than the most advanced American base at Trinidad. West Africa is, therefore, a part of the strategy of the Americas—a fact which is gradually being understood in the United States. In turn, from the Allies' point of view, Africa provides the best positions for offensive action against Axis Europe.

Africans themselves are forced by circumstances to play a secondary role in the world struggle which is being fought partly on their continent. Whatever may be the outcome of the war, their lives will be seriously affected. An Axis triumph means that they will exist merely as producers of raw materials for European factories. If the Allies are victorious, they are pledged to reconstruct the political and social life of all Africa. Under the pressure of events, they have already taken, in wartime, the first steps in the direction of the post-war reconstruction they promise.

55. "The Atlantic Islands," *The Economist*, May 17, 1941, p. 556.

56. *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, June 7, 1941.

57. *Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung*, March 26, 1941; *Der Deutsche Volkswirt*, May 30, 1941, pp. 1272-73; *Das Reich*, April 30, 1941; *New York Herald Tribune*, June 29, 1941.

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THE NETHERLANDS INDIES AT WAR

by T. A. Bisson